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Message Text

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62
ORIGIN AF-18

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

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SS-20 USIA-15 EB-11 NEA-14 SAM-01 ACDA-19 TRSE-00

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DRAFTED BY AF/S:RJDOLS:DH
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AF/P -JALINEHAN (DRAFT)
S/PRS-JKING (INFO)
USIA/IAA -WFENHAGEN (DRAFT)
AF/RA- JANGEREGG (DRAFT)
AF-JWFOLEY (DRAFT)
DOD/AF REG/ISA:GBADER (DRAFT)
NSC:HHORAN (DRAFT)
EB/ITP/EWT:SSGOODMAN (DRAFT
DOD/OASD/PA:JFREEMAN (DRAFT)
DOD/EUR REG/ISA:HSCHNELL (DRAFT)
S/S:WHLUERS
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R 272035Z SEP 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
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AMCONSUL LOURENCO MARQUES
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMCONSUL DURBAN
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
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AMEMBASSY MASERU
AMEMBASSY BLANTYRE
AMCONSUL LUANDA
CINCLANT

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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS

S E C R E T STATE 213729

E.O. 11652: X-GDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, US, SF
SUBJECT: TAD SZULC ARTICLE - ESQUIRE MAZAGINE
REF: A) STATE 209317; B) STATE 90949 (NOTAL); C) ADDIS ABABA 11205 (NOTAL); D) NAIROBI 7965 (NOTAL); E) CAPE TOWN 558 (NOTAL); F) CAPE TOWN 546 (NOTAL); G) IR 6 880 0241 74 (NOTAL); H) LONDON 12168 (NOTAL); I) LONDON 12266 (NOTAL); J) LISBON 4048 (NOTAL); K) NAIROBI 8099 (NOTAL); L) LAGOS 8970 (NOTAL)

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

1. SUMMARY: SZULC ARTICLE IN ESQUIRE MAGAZINE IS AMPLIFICATION OF EARLIER DISTORTED CLAIMS IN WASH. POST ARTICLE AND IS APPARENT SOURCE OF RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT US IS SELLING HELICOPTERS, RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, AND DEFOLIANTS TO SOUTH AFRICA FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. PRESS GUIDANCE ON LATTER CLAIMS SENT REFTEL A. THIS TELEGRAM PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR POSTS' USE IN REFUTING SERIES OF UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS THAT WASHINGTON HAS TILTED TOWARD PRETORIA AND IS HEADED FOR ANOTHER VIETNAM IN DEFENSE OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICA. END SUMMARY.

2. SZULC ARTICLE IN OCT. ISSUE ESQUIRE BASICALLY IS REHASH AND AMPLIFICATION OF DISTORTED CLAIMS MADE IN WASHINGTON POST PIECE ON MAY 2 (REF B; SEE ALSO AF PRESSCLIPS, MAY 7,

P.3.). CURRENT GUARDIAN, DIE BURGER, RAND DAILY MAIL, AND OTHER STORIES APPARENTLY ALL BASED ON OCTOBER ESQUIRE ARTICLE. IN MAY 2 POST STORY, SZULC ALLEGED THAT AS LONG
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AS A YEAR AGO U.S. AND NATO HAD BEGUN DRAWING UP "SECRET CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR AIR AND NAVAL DEFENSE OF SOUTH AFRICA" AND THAT, IN JUNE 1973, NATO'S DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE INSTRUCTED SACLANT TO PREPARE PLANS FOR AN "ALLIED AIR-NAVAL TASK FORCE TO STAND READY TO ASSIST SOUTH AFRICA, SHOULD THE NEED ARISE". SZULC CLAIMED "THIS WAS PART OF BROADER U.S. STRATEGY...TO REINFORCE POSITIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AGAINST SOVIET THREAT IN THE AREA" AND THAT "PLANS FOR ESTABLISHING NAVAL BASE AT DIEGO GARCIA FIT INTO THIS PATTERN". ALSO AS PART OF THIS PATTERN, SZULC ALLEGED THAT IN DECEMBER 1969 THE NSC DECIDED "TO PRESERVE A "BALANCE" IN SOUTHERN AFRICA." AS RESULT OF THIS ALLEGED NSC

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DECISION, SZULC SAID THE US "HAS BEEN QUIETLY SELLING
PORTUGAL 'NON-LETHAL' MILITARY END-ITEMS SUCH AS JEEPS,
RADIO SYSTEMS AND SPOTTER PLANES AS WELL AS DEFOLIANTS,"
HAS TRAINED PORTUGUESE OFFICERS IN COUNTER INSURGENCY"
IN CANAL ZONE, AND "HELPED IN TRAINING PORTUGUESE
PILOTS AT BASES IN WESTERN GERMANY."

3. FOLLOWING MAY 2 POST ARTICLE, DEPARTMENTS OF STATE
AND DEFENSE RESPONDED THAT U.S. AND NATO HAD NO PLANS
FOR AIR-NAVAL DEFENSE OF SOUTH AFRICA, THAT THE U.S.
FULLY SUPPORTS THE UN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA,
THAT SACLANT HAD NOT BEEN INSTRUCTED TO FORMULATE ANY
PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA, THAT ALLEGATION
THAT THERE WAS AN NSC DECISION TO PRESERVE A "BALANCE"
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS UNTRUE, THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT NEITHER
PROVIDED NOR SOLD ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO PORTUGAL
FOR USE IN AFRICA, THAT THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY TRAINING
OF PORTUGUESE MILITARY OR OTHER PERSONNEL IN CANAL ZONE,
AND THAT TRAINING OF PORTUGUESE PILOTS IS RESTRICTED TO
SUPPORT OF ITS NATO MISSIONS.

4. SUBSEQUENT TO MAY 2 POST ARTICLE, OTHER JOURNALISTS
SURFACED EXISTENCE OF A SACLANT STUDY CONCERNING STRATE-
GIC COMMODITIES, INCLUDING OIL, WHICH ARE BEING SHIPPED
THROUGH INDIAN OCEAN, AROUND THE CAPE, AND THROUGH SOUTH
ATLANTIC. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY IS TO LEARN WHAT NAVAL
FORCES, COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPORT FACILITIES, AND
TREATY ARRANGEMENTS ANY NATO MEMBERS MAY HAVE WHICH
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COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR DEFENSE OF THESE SHIPPING
ROUTES. THIS PLANNING TASK WAS AUTHORIZED BY NATO DEFENSE
PLANNING COMMITTEE (DPC) AND SACLANT WAS SPECIFICALLY

INSTRUCTED THAT ANY RESULTANT PLAN WOULD REQUIRE APPROVAL
OF NATO'S MILITARY COMMITTEE AND WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED
OR EXERCISED WITHOUT DPC APPROVAL. FURTHERMORE, DPC
INSTRUCTED THAT THIS CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS NOT TO BE
INTERPRETED AS EXTENDING NATO'S SOUTHERN BOUNDARY (TROPIC
OF CANCER) OR AS ACCEPTANCE BY NATO NATIONS OF ADDITIONAL
DEFENSE COMMITMENTS. FINALLY, DPC INSTRUCTED THAT THERE
BE NO CONTACT WITH NON-NATO COUNTRIES IN FORMULATING THIS
PLAN. THE DEPARTMENT SAID ON JULY 10 IN RESPONSE TO A
CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY CONCERNING IMPLICATION OF THIS
PLANNING "WE BELIEVE THAT U.S. AND NATO MUST HAVE AN
ASSURED OIL RESUPPLY TO EUROPE IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES.
WHILE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS HAD NO ACTIVE ROLE IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SACLANT PLAN, IT HAS BEEN AWARE
OF THIS EFFORT AND SUPPORTS NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING
IN PRINCIPLE AS AUTHORIZED BY THE DPC".

5. IN OCTOBER ESQUIRE ARTICLE, SZULC BASICALLY REPEATS

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EARLIER CHARGES SAYING U.S. POLICY, AS IT EVOLVED SINCE 1970, REPRESENTED A "TILT" IN FAVOR OF WHITE-RULED SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE THEN QUOTES EXTENSIVELY FROM THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP FOR AFRICA (NSC-IG) RESPONSE TO NSSM 39. NSSM 39 INSTRUCTED THE NSC-IG TO STUDY FULL RANGE OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO U.S. IN OUR SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY. THE NSC-IG RESPONSE TO NSSM 39 OUTLINED SIX OPTIONS, GIVING PREMISES UPON WHICH EACH OPTION WAS BASED, A GENERAL POLICY POSTURE WHICH WOULD FOLLOW FROM THE PREMISES, OPERATIONAL EXAMPLES OF GENERAL POSTURE, AND PROS AND CONS OF EACH OPTION. SZULC QUOTES ONLY FROM OPTION TWO OF RESPONSE TO NSSM 39 AND THEN USES NSDM 38, JANUARY 28, 1970, AS BASIS FOR HIS CLAIM THAT OPTION TWO WAS ADOPTED BY WHITE HOUSE. (NSDM 38 IS DECISION MEMORANDUM REFERRED TO BY SZULC AS BEING DATED FEBRUARY 1970 AND KNOWN AS "TAR BABY". LATTER TERM, INCIDENTALLY, APPARENTLY NEVER HAD ANY CURRENCY AS IT IS UNKNOWN TO PRESENT AND FORMER DEPARTMENT OFFICERS). NSDM 38, IN FACT, WAS ONLY ONE OF A NUMBER OF DECISION MEMORANDA

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WHICH WERE PUBLISHED FOLLOWING THE NSSM 39 EXERCISE. AT NO TIME WAS OPTION TWO OR ANY OTHER OPTION FORMALLY ADOPTED. RATHER, VARIOUS DECISIONS THAT RELATED TO EVERY ONE OF THE SIX OPTIONS OF NSSM 39 WERE SUBSEQUENTLY MADE. FYI: MOST OF THE DECISIONS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE WERE INCLUDED AS OPERATIONAL EXAMPLES OF OPTIONS WHICH WERE FAR MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN OPTION TWO. END FYI.

6. SZULC CLAIMED THAT, IN ADDITION TO ACCEPTING MOST OF OPTION TWO RECOMMENDATIONS, NIXON ADMINISTRATION IN SOME CASES EVEN WENT BEYOND THEM. AS AN EXAMPLE, SZULC ALLEGES THAT U.S. "GAVE A MOST ""LIBERAL"" INTERPRETATION" TO THE ARMS EMBARGO AND THUS SOUTH AFRICA WAS ALLOWED TO BUY BELL HELICOPTERS "WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE IN THE USG THAT THEY WOULD BE USED IN POLICE MILITARY OPERATIONS..." FACT IS THAT U.S. HAS LICENSED SALE TO SOUTH AFRICA OF VERY SMALL NUMBER OF BELL HELICOPTERS EACH YEAR FOR CIVILIAN COMMERCIAL USES ONLY AND SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT THERE BE NO RESALE OF TRANSFER TO THE SA MILITARY OR POLICE ESTABLISHMENTS. OUR SUBSEQUENT CHECKS INDICATE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO VIOLATIONS OF THE LICENSE CONDITIONS. SZULC ALLEGED SAME THING OCCURRED WITH "TWIN-ENGINED EXECUTIVE LEARJETS, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND EVEN CERTAIN COMBAT OR SUPPRESSION MISSIONS." TRUTH IS THAT WHILE ASST. SEC. NEWSOM SAID IN 1970 THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER LICENSING SALE OF LIMITED NUMBERS OF SMALL EXECUTIVE-TYPE JET AIRCRAFT TO SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE, NO SALES WERE EVER MADE. FURTHERMORE, MR. NEWSOM SAID NO SALES TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE WOULD BE LICENSED FOR ANY AIRCRAFT READILY

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ADAPTABLE FOR COMBAT OR SECURITY PURPOSES. SZULC THEN GOES ON TO CLAIM HERBICIDES AND DEFOLIANTS OF TYPE USED IN VIETNAM WERE ALSO SOLD TO SOUTH AFRICA. TRUTH IS THAT UNITED STATES MAINTAINS TWO TYPES OF CONTROLS OVER EXPORT OF HERBICIDES. THOSE SUBSTANCES WHICH ARE PREFERRED FOR DEFOLIANT USE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE UNDER LICENSING CONTROL OF OFFICE OF MUNITIONS CONTROL OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE. IN ADDITION, TWO SUBSTANCES COMMONLY CALLED 2, 4-D AND 2, 4, 5-T ARE ON THE VALIDATED LICENSE LIST MAINTAINED BY DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. APPLICATIONS FOR

LICENSES TO EXPORT THESE SUBSTANCES WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO SCRUTINY UNDER TERMS OF THE ARMS EMBARGOES. THERE HAS BEEN NO EXPORT OF THESE SUBSTANCES TO SOUTHERN AFRICA FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, A WIDE VARIETY OF AGRICULTURAL HERBICIDES WHICH ARE NOT UNDER SPECIFIC CONTROLS. THESE ARE SUBSTANCES WHICH ARE MANUFACTURED BY A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, ARE AVAILABLE FROM DIVERSE SOURCES, AND ARE IN COMMON AGRICULTURAL USE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

7. REGARDING SALE OF BOEING 707 AIRLINERS, SZULC CLAIMS THAT PORTUGAL "BENEFITED IN THE SAME WAY, "I.E., BY "RELAXATION" OF THE ARMS EMBARGO. BOEING 707'S WERE SOLD TO PORTUGAL AND THEY OBVIOUSLY WERE USED ON ROUTES LINKING METROPOLITAN PORTUGAL WITH ITS AFRICAN TERRITORIES, AS WELL AS ON OTHER ROUTES. MILITARY AS WELL AS CIVILIAN PASSENGERS WERE OBVIOUSLY CARRIED ON THESE SERVICES.

HOWEVER, SALE OF PASSENGER TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT TO PORTUGAL HAS NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED TO COME WITHIN TERMS OF OUR ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST THAT COUNTRY'S AFRICAN TERRITORIES AND IT IS INCORRECT TO ALLEGE THAT THIS IS EVIDENCE OF A RELAXATION OF THIS EMBARGO.

8. REMAINDER OF SZULC'S ARTICLE IS WHOLLY SPECULATIVE AND IMPLIES THAT U.S. IS HEADED FOR ANOTHER VIETNAM IN DEFENSE OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICA. AMONG POINTS HE RAISE TO SUPPORT THIS IMPLICATION ARE VISITS TO U.S. OF SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND INFORMATION MULDER IN JANUARY 1974 AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF BIERMANN IN MAY. SZULC SAYS MULDER SPENT FIVE DAYS IN WASHINGTON IN JANUARY "CONFERRING WITH" VICE PRESIDENT FORD, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, AND VICE ADMIRAL PEET. TRUTH IS THAT MULDER HAD 20 MINUTE COURTESY CALL ON THEN-VICE PRESIDENT WHICH HAD BEEN ARRANGED IN AUTUMN OF 1973 WHEN PRESIDENT FORD WAS STILL A MICHIGAN CONGRESSMAN. MULDER SAW NO DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICERS AND MADE ONLY A SHORT CALL ON VICE ADMIRAL PEET. IN EACH OF THESE MEETINGS, MULDER PRESSED FOR RENEWAL OF NAVAL VISITS AND OFFERED SOUTH AFRICAN ENERGY COOPERATION. NO OFFICIAL RESPONSES

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WERE MADE TO MULDER ON THESE POINTS. REGARDING BIERMANN
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VISIT, SZULC SAYS BIERMANN MET WITH SECRETARY OF NAVY MIDDENDORF AND DINED WITH 17 ADMIRALS AT HOME OF A MARYLAND CONGRESSMAN. BIERMANN WAS GUEST OF A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION, U.S. STRATEGIC INSTITUTE, AND HE WAS ISSUED A VISA ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WOULD MAKE NO OFFICIAL CONTACTS WHILE IN U.S. THEREAFTER, BIERMANN CALLED ON NAVY SECRETARY MIDDENDORF AND THEN JCS CHIEF MOORER, BOTH OF WHOM SUBSEQUENTLY STATED THAT THEIR MEETINGS WERE OF A COURTESY NATURE ONLY. BIERMANN SAW NEITHER DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICIALS NOR OTHER USG OFFICIALS AND HIS OTHER ACTIVITIES WERE PRIVATELY ARRANGED.

9. ALL OF FOREGOING MAY BE USED AT POSTS' DISCRETION, EXCEPT FOR FYI MATERIAL AS INDICATED AND SPECIFIC CITATIONS TO NSSM 39 AND NSDM 38. BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A STUDY MEMORANDUM AND A DECISION MEMORANDUM IS PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND SHOULD BE STRESSED SINCE SZULC MAKES IMPORTANT ERROR IN CITING PARTS OF A STUDY MEMORANDUM AS BEING PART OF A DECISION MEMORANDUM. STUDY MEMORANDUM IS WHAT NAME IMPLIES, I.E., A STUDY OF RANGE OF AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS AND A DECISION MEMORANDUM RECORDS POLICY DECISIONS. FYI: THESE DOCUMENTS ARE ALWAYS CLASSIFIED. END FYI.

10. OTHER PRESS STORIES BASED ON SZULC'S ESQUIRE ARTICLE (E.G., JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, SEPT. 18 AND SEVERAL CITED BY AF POSTS) NOW ARE GOING FURTHER AND STATING BALDLY THAT U.S. HAS DECIDED TO SELL HELICOPTERS AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT TO SOUTH AFRICA. DEPARTMENT CONSEQUENTLY HAS HAD A RASH OF INQUIRIES FROM AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS AND ANTI-APARTHEID ORGANIZATIONS. POSTS MAY DENY THAT THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN OUR ARMS EMBARGO POLICY AND, UNLESS THEY HAVE ALREADY DONE SO, SHOULD MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT IN PLACES WHERE PRESS HAS CARRIED ERRONEOUS ARTICLES OR WHERE HOST GOVERNMENTS HAVE INQUIRED ABOUT OUR POLICY.

11. COPIES OF SZULC ARTICLE POUCHED TO ALL ADDRESSEES.
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